Ancient Greek Dialectic and its Reception

International Conference

Department of Philosophy-University of Patras

Organization: Melina G. Mouzala

15-16 June 2021

Abstracts

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Dialectic, Peirastic and Scientific Expertise in Aristotle

Peirastic is a branch (or use) of dialectic which enables one to examine expertise claims from some common principles of reasoning. Peirastic examination does not require that the examiner have any expertise on the specific subject. The examination takes place in the form of a dialogue, in which the premises are supplied by the expert (or false expert), whereas the examiner conducts the reasoning through some common principles in such a way that they end up concluding something wrong—a false proposition. In short, peirastic examination produces valid arguments with false conclusions that depend on (at least) one false premise assumed by the answerer. As such, peirastic can be employed both to unmask impostors (who are exposed as false experts) and to detect mistakes that a bona fide but careless expert can commit. Now, the propositions involved in such arguments need not be sophisticated from the point of view of the expertise in question. Their premises need not express strong explanatory claims. The examiner does not need to have deep convictions about them. Suppose, for instance, that it is common knowledge that whales breathe. Now, a careless expert being submitted to examination drops the proposition that no aquactic animal breathes. The peirastic examiner will be able to put together this argument: "No aquactic animal breathes; whales are aquactic animals; therefore, no whale breathes". Of course, we can imagine more sophisticated scenarios (and more sophisticated arguments) for peirastic examination, but this example is enough for my purposes. Now, a peirastic argument by which an examiner exposes a mistake (or an imposture) in the domain of a given discipline is somehow similar to what Aristotle calls "pseudographemata". Note that I have put "somehow" in italics, for all I want is to highlight some similarities between these sorts of argument. A peirastic argument by which an examiner exposes a mistake (or an imposture) in the domain of a given discipline has these features: [i] it is a valid reasoning. [ii] the premises are pertinent to the subject-matter in question. [iii] (at least) one premise is false. [iv] the conclusion is false. On the other hand, the differences between the two sorts of argument are clear enough. First, peirastic argument is dialogical and conducted by the dialectician, whereas pseudographemata lack those features. Besides, whereas a pseudographema just is a mistake made by an expert in her efforts, peirastic arguments are cross-examinations essentially designed to detect and expose ignorance, either the ignorance of the impostor or the mere mistake of the careless expert. Now, is it possible for

a sophist to make a counterfeit of peirastic and at the same time (falsely) presents himself as an expert? I argue that it is possible—and that Aristotle was worried with arguments of this sort. It is useful to see that features [iii] and [iv] can be grouped together as ways of saying something false. Now, the sort of argument I am suggesting is such that the label "saying something false" is still applicable, but cashed out differently. The sort of arguments I am highlighting have these features: [a] they are sound arguments. [b] their propositions belong to the subject-matter in question (= [ii]). [c] they say something false—they are false explanations, more precisely: the explanations they encode seem to be appropriate to the explanandum without being so. These arguments try to expose (what the sophist claims to be) false expertise—but not by spotting false propositions, but by presenting an explanatory alternative (as if) against the expert. These arguments have some similarities with pseudographemata: first, their premises, although not explanatorily suited to the explanandum, belong to the subject-matter in question; besides, since soundness implies validity, [a] has some similarity to [i]. Finally, they say something false. These arguments seem to be appropriate to the explanandum (and so they embarass even the experts). They are intended to imply that the explanation they express is better than the explanation presented by experts, so that their success will produce the effect of falsely exposing the experts as inferior to the sophist. As such, arguments of this sort cannot be detected by mere peirastic, for their detection requires a considerable level of expertise. That is why they have attracted Aristotle's attention.

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Simplicius' Approach to Aristotle's Dialectic and his Place in the Aristotelian Tradition

In this paper I aim to undertake an analysis of Simplicius' views on Aristotle's dialectic, building on earlier examinations of his method (Baltussen 2008 and *forthc*). When in my title I refer to this late Platonist as part of the "Aristotelian tradition", this notion arises in particular from Simplicius' sterling track record as commentator on Aristotle's works which stands out among the Platonists and deserves noting. I will show that we can extract from various works an idea of his understanding of Aristotle's dialectical method, even if he does not seem to develop a highly theoretical view on this point. It will also require us to articulate what Simplicius understood "dialectic" to mean, beyond its original sense of a debating technique. But rather than undertake a terminological survey of his use of *dialektikē*, I want to show his specific interest in, and use of, dialectic as a methodology for the analysis of coherence in an author. I will conclude that in some ways Simplicius echoes certain mechanisms from Aristotle's dialectical procedures, but he will also adjust certain moves to fit his overall philosophical agenda.

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Proclus on Plato's dialectic

One of the many hard problems in Plato scholarship is how to understand the relation between the method of dialectic as it is described in the middle books of the *Republic* and the method that is called 'dialectic' and described or illustrated in dialogues such as *Phaedrus* or *Statesman*. In short, what is the relation between Republican dialectic and the method of collection and division? This short paper looks at Proclus' description of the kinds of dialectic in his commentary on the first part of the *Parmenides*. Proclus argues for a threefold division of dialectic: the kind that argues both sides of the question; the kind that exhibits only the truth; and the kind that serves only to refute false beliefs (*in Parm*. 654.11–13). In describing the truth-exhibiting kind of dialectic, he does not so much *argue* for the unity of collection and division with Republican dialectic as to *perform* this unity. The paper elucidates this distinction and its implications for how we should understand the activity of Platonic philosophising in late antiquity.

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The Dialectician, the Sophist and the In-between: Watching the Philosopher's Dramatic Strategies in Socrates' First Speech of the *Phaedrus*

I would like to focus on something which I find essential to the philosopher's characterization that, in my view, has not received the attention it deserves. I mean the search for a common basis to start a dialogue, the use of silence to hide what is not common for a while, and the introduction of certain tricks to suggest what cannot be said openly, as dramatic strategies used by Socrates in his first speech of the *Phaedrus.*

This Socrates is not the self-confident ironical master of discussion and refutation that we find in the *Gorgias* or the *Republic*. He is in conflict with himself. He has not managed to get to know who he is, and doubts whether he is a beast full of appetites and arrogance or a civilized creature with a divine destiny. This much more human character is at times under the influence of irrational forces, which make him half-yield to the wishes of others. In my view, the *Phaedrus* is the proper dialogue to grasp the philosopher's use of silence for, after the game takes place in the first part of the dialogue, Socrates shows his cards to Phaedrus in the second part.

On the other hand, as Socrates does not manage to persuade Phaedrus about the implicit perverse features of the dispassionate 'non-lover' defended by Lysias after his first speech is delivered, one could object that Socrates' cautious silence, being ineffective, plays no part in the dramatic action. However, in my view, the philosopher does use this weapon, because it is the first step to take as part of his didactic procedure.

However, if the interlocutor cannot come to the right conclusion, due to intellectual or emotional limitations, the process has to give a turn. And this is precisely what Socrates does when he threats Phaedrus to cross the river and leave him alone. This essential step makes the game end. All of a sudden, Phaedrus is ready to listen. And Socrates prepares a different path: the palinode, which is the strategy to make Phaedrus feel that, being a soul capable of the highest summits, he deserves to behave as a real lover who would take care of his beloved's soul and would lead him to philosophy, rather than as a pretender non-lover who should be pleased for almost nothing.

But the fact that the dialogue follows a longer path does not annul the necessary first step, which implies the philosopher's use of cautious silence, as he needs to move gradually from similarity to similarity, starting from the interlocutor's accepted opinions, and concealing certain views the interlocutor is not ready to accept, when emotional factors strongly interfere in the process of learning.

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Socrates' flight into the Logoi: On Plato's *Phaedo,* 99e4-100a3

This paper deals with the *deuteros plous*, literally 'the second voyage', proverbially 'the next best way', discussed in Plato's Phaedo, the key passage being Phd. 99e4-100a3:

[S1] ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν λήθειαν.

[S2] ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν;

[S3] οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν ἔργοις.[1]

[S1] So I decided that I must take refuge in the logoi and look at the truth of things in them.

[S2] However, perhaps this image is inadequate;

[S3] for I do not altogether admit that one who investigates things by means of logoi is dealing with images more than one who looks at realities (Tr. Grube, with modification).

I argue that the 'flight into the logoi' can have two different interpretations, a standard one and a non-standard one. The issue is whether at 99e-100a Socrates means that both the student of erga and the student of logoi consider images ('the standard interpretation'), or the student of logoi does not consider images, but "consistency should suffice for truth" ('the non-standard interpretation'); I argue for the second interpretation and I will indicate that the this interpretation of Socrates' dialectic has been already anticipated by Leibniz, when he writes: "… after establishing something like a second voyage I did enter another path which, if it does not explain everything, does not tolerate that something false is said" (my translation).[2]

[1] Platonis Opera, I, recognoverunt breviquer annotatione critica instruxerung E.A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W.S. M. Nicoli, D.B. Robinson et J.C.G. Strachan, Oxford 1995.

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Dialectic and Allegorical Interpretation in Proclus' Commentary on the *Republic*

One of the central features of Neoplatonic interpretation is the juxtaposing of various texts from different authors to expose the underlying truth inherent in all of them. Whether a Neoplatonic author is discussing Greek philosophical texts, poetic texts, or texts of ancient wisdom such as the *Chaldaean Oracles*, there will be a basic tenet of Platonic philosophy that underlies all of them. This being so, it is not at all surprising to find Proclus in his commentary to the *Republic*, explicating a passage from Plato through the lens of Orphism and Hesiod's *Works and Days*. I wish to use this Procline text to highlight how the Athenian philosopher uses diverse texts to underscore an interpretation that is at once surprising and (when more carefully considered) natural for a later Neoplatonist.

In the 13th Essay of his commentary, Proclus embarks on an 80-page discussion of the discourse of the Muses in book VIII of the *Republic*. In the essay, Proclus discusses the decline of the state and the problem of knowing the mathematical formula behind discovering the perfect number and so the perfect time for the mating of the guardians, a mating that will insure the birth of children capable of governing properly. In section 42 (II.74.26-78.11), he tackles the meaning of the Platonic noble lie that the citizens in the ideal state were fashioned in the earth and that the best of them were blended with gold and would be rulers, the second best with silver and would be auxiliaries, and the rest with bronze and iron (*R*. III.414b8-415d5).

In this paper we will look at the ways that Proclus associates the Hesiod's myth of the five ages of human beings with Plato's three parts of the ideal state. Proclus uses Hesiod's myth to argue that both myths portray a Neoplatonic universe in which the highest class exists in the Intelligible Realm and engages in intellection alone, the middle class straddles both the Intelligible and Psychic realms and engages in both intellection and discursive reasoning, and the lowest class loses contact with the Intelligible and lives a life encumbered by passions in the realm of Nature.

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Exegesis as Philosophy: Aristotelian Dialectical Methods in Later Neoplatonism

It is often pointed out that later ancient Mediterranean philosophers taught and did philosophy in a medium of textual interpretation—the exegēsis of literary and philosophical "classics," including Plato, Aristotle, and Homer, with care to preserve their "harmony" or compatibility. There is some consensus that this strategy did more than constrain the later ancient Platonists; it also led to creative philosophical and scientific conclusions. Moreover, the exercise of copying and interpreting a text constituted an important feature of the philosophical "ways of life" adopted in late antiquity. In this paper, I would like to explore some of the methodological roots of that practice. I begin with several methodological remarks in Aristotle that associate philosophy with interpretation, and explore their development in the Stoics and Plotinus, before settling on examples from the Neoplatonists. Along the way, I hope to trace several of the metaphilosophical and pedagogical assumptions that helped to motivate this posture toward "exegesis as philosophy" in late antiquity.

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Common Forms as a Prerequisite for Dialectic in Plato's *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*

In Plato's *Parmenides* Parmenides admits (135b5-c2), after having relentlessly criticized Socrates' assumption that there are forms, that forms are nevertheless necessary for thought (διάνοια), the power of discourse (ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις), and philosophy (φιλοσοφία). He suggests that young Socrates is unable to answer his criticism because he lacks training and that he should "drag" himself "through what is … condemned by the multitude as idle talk [ἀδολεσχίας]" (135d3-5). This "idle talk," it may be argued, is what Plato elsewhere terms dialectic. Training in this activity, Parmenides claims, is necessary for attaining the truth (ἡ ἀλήθεια; 135d5-6).

It would seem that Parmenides is claiming that forms such as likeness and unlikeness, oneness and plurality, change and rest are particularly important; for the training he recommends is centered on those (see 136a4-b6). Earlier, Socrates suggested that such forms are separate from what can be perceived (128e6-a2, 129d6-e4) and Parmenides now praises this suggestion (135d8-e4). The upshots are that positing such forms as separate from what is perceptible is necessary if we are to account for the possibility of thought, the power

of discourse, and philosophy and that dialectical training centered on such forms is called for both in order to give an adequate defense of such forms and to attain truth. It is less than clear from Parmenides' brief suggestions, however, why that is so.

It is fair to assume that the argument Parmenides pursues in the rest of the *Parmenides* is meant to present at least part of the answer to this question. But the interpretation of this argument is notoriously controversial and no general agreement as to what bearing it has on Plato's conception of philosophy and the attainment of truth has emerged. In this presentation, I argue that part of the answer may be elicited from the *Theaetetus*, a dialogue connected both dramatically and argumentatively to the *Parmenides*.

The inquiry of the *Theaetetus* centered on Protagoras' "man is measure" doctrine sets out from the assumption that there is nothing that is "itself by itself" (αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ) (152d2-3), that is, from the denial of the assumption made by the young Socrates at the beginning of the Parmenides (128e6-a2). The first part of the *Theaetetus*, I argue, can therefore be read as a companion piece to the first part of the *Parmenides*. In the latter dialogue, Parmenides points out to a young Socrates some troubling consequences following from the hypothesis that some things are themselves by themselves. In the former an old Socrates points out the consequences following from the hypothesis that there are not; and these consequences, I further argue, explain why at least some forms must be posited and why one must inquire into them in order to attain truth.

I concentrate on a crucial passage in the inquiry of the *Theaetetus* where the identification of knowledge and perception is dismissed for a second time, that is 184b3-186e12. Here Socrates brings up certain common terms such as unity, identity, difference, beautiful and ugly, good and bad, and suggests that, whatever they are, they are not accessible through the power of the senses, but only through a power that the soul unfolds by itself. My overall claim in the presentation is that the passage 184b3-186e12 makes clear why we need to posit unity, identity, and difference as separate forms if we are to account for knowledge and truth, while the earlier discussion of Protagoras' view found at 168c8-179b9 makes clear why we need to posit forms such as the beautiful and the good. These two kinds of forms correspond to those that the young Socrates of the *Parmenides* is especially inclined to posit (see 130b1-d9). If the interpretation I argue for is correct, we may therefore read the *Theaetetus* as the old Socrates' vindication of his youthful self.

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"Dialectics, in eleventh century Constantinople"

The nature of dialectics in eleventh century Constantinople is revealed by Psellos and Italos. The latter's essays reveal a direct engagement with the Aristotelian tradition and especially the commentaries on the Organon. Psellos' essays in Philosophica Minora I and II edited by Duffy and O'Meara respectively reveal why he thought that Aristotle's thought was a preparation for Platonic thought and dialectics. The paper will investigate not only formal

differences but Psellos' considerations on the meaning and role of logic within philosophy in contrast with the more 'aristotelian' approach of his student Italos.

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Friendly Fire: Dialectic Struggles Between Plato and the Megarians

The Socratic circle included many different lines. Among them, the Megarics and Plato shared important features in contrast to those characterized by their materialism or hedonism, like Antisthenes or the Cyrenaics. However, they had significant differences in their conception of philosophy. In this work, we will review three aspects that illustrate this problematic relation. First, we will analyze their disagreements regarding foundation and the possible Platonic allusion to the Megarics in the allegory of the sun in *Republic*, VI. Then, we will examine the methodological differences attested in the *Euthydemus*. Finally, we will study the Megarics' protagonism in discussing the third man argument, alluding to Stilpo's case against Plato.

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Psellos on Allegory and Dialectic

Psellos, as a philosopher steeped in the Christian and non-Christian traditions, navigates his way through the tensions of this combined heritage with remarkable deftness. Two of his primary means of accomplishing this ever-fraught conciliation are dialectic and allegory. In addition to his employment of these modes of thought and discourse, Psellos on occasion offers definitions of both and descriptions of their activities. These definitions are often in response to others (e.g. *Philosophica Minora* 2.13) but nonetheless emerge from his practice as we can observe it elsewhere. Importantly, Psellos claims that both of these modes are applicable to any subject matter, allowing him considerable flexibility in their use in recovering aspects of pagan Platonism, as well as in elaborating Orthodox positions by means which are harmonious with his philosophical commitments. Indeed, as we shall see, it is often in discussing Christian theological topics that Psellos is at his most independent.

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Pursuing Self-Knowledge in Plato's *Sophist*: The communion of the Sophistic and Socratic Dialectic in the sixth definition of the sophist (A reading based on Proclus' interpretation of Dialectic in the *Sophist*)

Heidegger in his analysis of Plato's *Sophist* points out that the sixth definition of the sophist always struck commentators as a consideration lying outside the framework of the previous definitions mainly because they were at a loss to see how this definition could be brought into the framework of the dichotomies. However, we will follow a line of interpretation which claims that when the fifth definition places the emphasis on *logos* it paves the way to the sixth definition; *logos* is a human characteristic which brings to the fore and realizes the manifestation of all thinking and specifically of controversies and disputations in which our thought is involved and expressed. The same subject is reserved and developed in the sixth definition. Moreover, the sixth definition, apart from the explicit discussion of purification or cathartic Dialectic, actually thematizes division itself.

According to Proclus, the name ʿeristicʾ in itself is neutral, since it only indicates the activity of controverting and raising objections and since there is good and bad strife. The dialectician belongs to the class of the money-wasting eristic which can be called nothing else than babbling (ἀδολεσχία). The notion of communion (κοινωνία) is implicitly examined for the first time in the dialogue within the sixth definition of the sophist where the Sophistic and the Socratic Dialectic are commingled. We will show that from the analysis of the crucial passage 230 b-d, we can infer that the basic characteristic of Socrates' cathartic method is a specific emotional attitude of the person who is subjected to elenchus, which due to its reflexive and self-referent character leads to self-knowledge. This kind of self-knowledge is a kind of self-recovery or self-recollection. Moreover, the same emotional attitude, in cooperation with the cohesive and therapeutic intervention of the unificatory logos, binds again the person who is subjected to elenchus with the latent commonality of an intersubjective wisdom which has been forgotten.

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Dialectical Method(s) in Plato's late dialogues

Accounts of Plato's Late Dialectic highly differ, yet they almost all assume that the dialectical method remains *one and the same*. According to the standard interpretation, the *Phaedrus*, the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, and the *Philebus* display a single dialectical method, which is first introduced in the "canonical passage" of the *Phaedrus* (*Phdr*. 265c8–266c8), where Socrates claims that "dialecticians" are those who can perform two complementary tasks called Collection and Division.

In this paper, I challenge what I refer to as the “one-method interpretation”. By means of a close textual analysis, I show that even within a single dialogue from this period, we encounter different dialectical methods, namely methods dealing with different objects, proceeding in different ways, and aiming at different goals. By focusing on the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, I furthermore argue that Plato aims to provide the interlocutors as well as us readers with a *family* of dialectical methods.

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Ancient Greek Dialectic and its Reception in Origen of Alexandria: From Plato to Christ-Truth

I shall consider Plato's dialectic (influenced by Parmenides in turn, notwithstanding the conflictual relation between them) as an important motif of inspiration for the Christian Platonist Origen. An examination of the meaning, function, and partition of dialectic in Plato will be argued to have impacted Origen's philosophical theology. An analysis of the role of dialectic in imperial pre-Plotinian Platonism, Clement, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Plotinus will yield interesting comparisons with Origen.
I shall point out that Origen knows Plato's dialectics, employs Aristotle's and the Stoics' logic-dialectics, and attributes dialectic to Scripture (one of the many convergences he found). I will investigate Origen's view of dialectics in the *Thanksgiving Oration*, also as a thinking attitude against psychagogy (Origen is likely to have been inspired by Plato, besides Christ-Truth). Origen's 'zetetic' method is an expression of dialectics. Final reflections will be devoted to dialectic's relation to philosophy/theology in Plato, the Stoics, the *Didaskalikos*, and Origen.

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Dialectic as true rhetoric in Plato’s *Gorgias*

Plato’s *Gorgias* is usually interpreted as a radical condemnation of rhetoric, a condemnation that is also often seen as incompatible with the apparent use of rhetorical tricks by Socrates. In fact, true rhetoric is subtly referred to throughout the dialogue, as many ancient readers of the dialogue recognized. This noble rhetoric corrects, or refutes, instead of flattering the way conventional rhetoric does. Socrates reveals this true rhetoric only gradually: 454e-455d, 480c-d, 503a-b, 504d, 508b-c, 516e-517a, 527b-c. Moreover, the dialectic Socrates practices coincides with true rhetoric, and he employs it in two ways: one that is strictly rational or argumentative, the other that, for lack of a proper interlocutor, appeals to the emotions with a view to mere persuasion, such as is the case with myth. As a result, the dramatic action is inseparably joined to the argumentation. Against his non-philosophical interlocutors, Socrates

defends dialectic as justice by correcting them. The paper concentrates on how Socrates, together with Plato, gradually allude to true rhetoric and its connexions with the dialectic being practiced.

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Dialectic and Skepticism in the Academy

We were brought up in the understanding of dialectics which was formed within German classical philosophy. For such a type of dialectics, the concept of sublation (Aufhebung) is crucial. But for Plato's dialectics, "sublation" or "synthesis" is not an obligatory result, and holding the two poles apart, or antinomy is not a sign of the limitation of reason. According to Plato, Being itself is that way: It is able to dwell in opposed modes of acting and undergoing (*Sophist*). However, the antinomic model of Plato's dialectic is not skepticism, since it does not lead to refraining from judgments. Academic skepticism could only have arisen after Aristotle had formed a model for such a method that had a definition as its climax. Only after that could dialectics, that grasp the very essence of being, but doesn't end with a definition, be understood as an indication of the boundaries of the claims of the reason that moves within definitions, that is, as a kind of skeptical procedure. Cicero's criticism of the four "fundamentals" of the Stoic epistemology can be seen as an excellent example of the evolution of dialectics in the Academy.

Harold Tarrant

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Elenchus and Syllogistic in Olympiodorus of Alexandria

Farnçois Renaud has written informatively on Olympiodorus' treatment of elenchus in the *Commentary on Plato's First Alcibiades*. I do not wish to challenge this so much as to extend the treatment of *elenchus* to other commentaries of this author, and to examine what elenchus might mean not only in *On Alcibiades* but also in *On Gorgias*, where many of the rules for *elenchus* are set. And not only in the context of Socratic examination as practised in *On Alcibiades* and *On Gorgias*, but also what its place is in the treatment of the rather different Socrates of the *Phaedo* and, especially of *On Meteorologica*, which is treating an Aristotelian treatise to which Socrates is irrelevant. Renaud (2014, 120) could write 'from a formal point of view, there is nothing to distinguish Socratic elenchus from philosophic argument in general,' and if this is so then there should be cases of elenctic that are not only non-Socratic but also non-Platonic.

We shall find that the vocabulary of *elenchus* is not found in *On Phaedo* at all, and the primary term used for an argument seems to be *epikheirêma*. The latter term was also more common than talk of demonstration (*apodeixis*) or syllogism in the commentaries on *Phaedo* and *Meteorologica* alike, occurring about 12 and 15 times per 10000 words, when 'demonstration' is mentioned less than 1.5 times in either text. In general, the stronger the terminology the more reluctant Olympiodorus is to use it in these two seemingly late works. The case of the *Meteorologica*, a work that fails to use the terminology anywhere, is particularly interesting. In the first 60000 words (approx) the terminology is found 51 times, but in the last 50000 not at all. So, it belongs only to the treatment of the first two books of the *Meteorologica*, not the last two. I shall explore why this is so, and how it fits Olympiodorus' changing interests.

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The role of dialectic in Evgenios Voulgaris' logical treatise

Evgenios Voulgaris (1716-1806), an emblematic representative of the modern Greek Enlightenment, was very sensitive to the fact that some of his own colleagues and students ignored the rules of dialectic and, thus, their statements contained inconsistencies and contradictions. This paper focuses on the chapter Voulgaris devoted in his systematic work *Logic* (Leipzig 1766) to the methods and rules of dialogue ("Περὶ Μεθόδου τῆς κατ' Ἀντίθεσιν Ἤτοι Προσδιαλεκτικῆς", pp. 573-586). Based mainly on ancient philosophy, Voulgaris argued that the first method is an implementation of the Socratic and Platonic dialectic, based on questions and answers. The second method is based on logical syllogisms or rhetorical enthymemes, in accordance with Aristotelianism, Stoicism and Scholasticism. The use of dialectic in general is considered to be necessary both for the mind and the soul. It is a means of preparation and exercise of the mind, which is also able to acquire knowledge, while the soul achieves tranquility and peace, as it remains free from passions and agitation.

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Syrianus on Dialectic

In his *Commentary on the Parmenides* 1001, Proclus outlines the principle method of dialectic as invented by Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides. He says:

> "Two hypotheses being laid down, viz. *if a thing is*, and *if it is not*, each of these may be tripled, by considering in each *what happens, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen*."

He elaborates that what he means by this "if a thing is" and "if it is not" is the relationship between the thing itself with respect to others and others with respect to themselves and

others with respect to the thing itself. From the set of question following upon these relationships, Proclus derives twenty-four hypotheses outlining what a thing is and what it is not. Proclus applies this method to his discussion of the One in his *Commentary on the Parmenides*, with a focus on the first eight hypotheses of what can be said about the One and what can be said about being and intelligible beings at they relate to the One. Thus, the question give rise to a metaphysical discussion of the One and the universe.

Proclus credits his teacher Syrianus with this system. In his theological interpretation of the *Parmenides*, Syrianus shows how the nature of the One is seen in the structure of the dialogue itself. The first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* outlines the primal God, while the intelligible universe is the subject of the second hypothesis, insofar as the intelligible universe is a product of the One. In *In Parm*. 1114.25, particularly with respect to what can be said about the One "in itself" or "in another", Syrianus says that the One "in another' speaks to the realm below the One, the intelligible realm. This question of how a thing relates to itself and relates to another because the primary paradigm by which Syrianus views the realm of the One and the intelligible realm. In his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* (p. 119, 28; Syrianus, *In Met*. 1179b33-5),, Syrianus follows the same logical structure he applied to the One, this time to the forms. He says that forms are each distinct in themselves and yet they relate fully within each other when viewed from another perspective. That is they remain in themselves and yet each are somehow contained within each other in the intelligible realm. This logical framework is repeated in fragments from Syrianus's *Commentary on the Philebus* (Damascius, *In Phil*. Sect. 244), where the three monads of the *Philebus* mimic the basic behavior shown in "the One in itself" and "the One in another" in that they are differentiated, but still coordinated at the level of Intellect. This paper will explore the method of relation as dialectic applied to the metaphysics of Syrianus.
